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INTRODUCTION

Richard Epstein's work in intellectual property reflects his long-held belief in the
importance of crafting "a sound system of legal rules" on the basis of a utilitarian
calculus that seeks "the maximization of social utility." 1 His refrain is consistent and
clear: intellectual property rights are born of the same functionalist policy concerns as
traditional property rights in land and chattels. As he has remarked, "a unified set of
principles apply to both physical and intangible property," because both types of
in securing to owners the "exclusive rights of
property share a "common aspiration"
2
disposition."
and
use
possession,
In this article for the Eighth Annual Legal Scholarship Symposium celebrating the
work of Richard Epstein, I want to explore one aspect of Epstein's utilitarian defense of
intellectual property rights: courts should secure to patentees their exclusive rights of use
and disposition by applying to patent conveyances the same default rule used in real
* Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; J.D., University of Chicago;
M.A., Columbia University; B.A., University of Michigan. Thank you to the Tulsa Law Review for hosting
this symposium celebrating the work of my teacher, mentor and friend, Richard Epstein. I also wish to thank
Bruce Johnson, Bruce Kobayashi, Timothy Muris, Henry Smith and Joshua Wright, and the participants in a
Robert A. Levy Fellows Workshop in Law & Liberty at George Mason University School of Law, for their
invaluable comments.
1. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rulesfor a Complex World 30 (Harv. U. Press 1995).
2. Richard A. Epstein, The DisintegrationoflintellectualProperty,62 Stan. L. Rev. - (forthcoming 2010)
(ms. at 5-6, available at http://ssm.com/abstract'1236273).
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property conveyances. Accordingly, Epstein maintains that courts should enforce the
rights of patentees to convey lesser interests in their property, such as the right to
manufacture or sell a patented invention only within a designated territory, when these
restrictions are expressly provided in conveyance instruments and the relevant
downstream parties have notice of them. In the absence of express terms providing
reasonable notice of restrictions, courts should follow the same approach they have
adopted in real property: in an unconditional conveyance, a patentee alienates all of its
interests and thus exhausts any property claims against subsequent downstream users.
Such doctrines in real property have long provided stable legal mechanisms for
landowners to engage in price discrimination and in other use-restricting strategies to
maximize the commercial value in their property, and the same conveyance default rule
in patent law would achieve similar efficiencies. It is my purpose to assess whether
Epstein's endorsement of this property-based conveyance rule for patents makes sense
within the patent system.
Given some unfortunate misunderstandings about Epstein's views on intellectual
property, though, it is necessary to note at the outset that he has eschewed a formalistic
application of real property doctrines to the realm of inventions. Although some critics
have accused him of being "dogmatic" and "simplistic" in linking tangible property and
intellectual property, 3 his work highlights what he considers to be the "plausible but not
infallible assumptions" that underlie intellectual property entitlements. 4 He believes that
intellectual property rights, like all legal doctrines, reveal that "everything is a matter of
delicate tradeoff and accommodation," 5 and he has explained in great detail how the
"basic trade-off between administrative costs and improved incentives for private
behavior is always with us." 6 Even for someone who does not share his commitment to
utilitarianism or agree with all of his prescriptions, there is much to appreciate in his
[us] to the multiple
scholarly work on intellectual property, as he has sought to "sensitize
7
issues of system design that arise with all forms of property."
3. See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or
Doomed Relationship?, 34 Ecol. L.Q. 713, 717, 753-54 (2007); cf Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciated
Retrospective, 15 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 439, 439-40 (2006) (surveying similar criticisms of Epstein's
earlier property scholarship).
4. Richard A. Epstein, Liberty vs. Property?Cracks in the Foundationsof CopyrightLaw, 42 S.D. L. Rev.
1,4 (2005).
5. Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind. L.J. 803, 806
(2001).
6. Epstein, supran. 1, at 34. On the basis of his utilitarian metric, Epstein has described at length how the
analysis of systemic costs and benefits both justifies and limits the scope of protections afforded to intellectual
property. Belying claims that Epstein is dogmatically treating intellectual property as real property, he has
described the rough, second-best justification for the durational term limits in copyrights and patents, as
opposed to the unlimited duration in fee simples. See Epstein, supra n. 5, at 821-27. He also was an early
critic of extending patent protection to DNA. See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in cDNA Sequences: A
New Resident for the Public Domain, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 575 (1996) [hereinafter Epstein, Property
Rights]. When he returned to the issue years later and after more study of patent law, he reaffirmed his position
that DNA patents are unjustified. See Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: PropertyRights in Genetic
Material,in Perspectiveson Propertiesin the Human Genome Project 153, 188-93 (F. Scott Kieff ed., Elsevier
Academic Press 2003). Lastly, he was a vocal opponent of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, see
Richard A. Epstein, Congress's Copyright Giveaway, 232Wall St. J. A19 (Dec. 21, 1998), which he deemed to
be a "massive giveaway of public domain resources for private use." Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious
Constitutionalityofthe Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 123, 128 (2003).
7. Epstein, supran. 5, at 827.
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This article is limited to assessing his claim that the commercialization of patents
should be secured with the same conveyance default rule that has long been applied to
real property, and it does so from two perspectives: first, it explains how nineteenthcentury patent doctrine supports his normative thesis that patentees should be secured in
the use and disposition of their property, and, second, it discusses some possible
complicating factors that arise from his utilitarian justification for antitrust review of
conveyances of patent rights. There is no special reason for the history-theory split other
than that these are the two hats that I wear in my own scholarship on patent law. 8 When
I have applied this perspective to Epstein's analysis of the legal rules for patent
conveyances, I am struck by the degree of convergence between his normative
prescription and historical reality. Yet this same historical evidence also suggests
reasons to doubt whether his support for rule-of-reason antitrust standards can function
as a backstop to the default rule for patent conveyances.
This article proceeds in two parts. First, it will identify and explain the historical
doctrine that correlates with Epstein's normative argument in favor of a conveyance
default rule. This provides some important empirical verification for his normative
prescription that simple conveyance default rules are essential to a successful legal
regime securing property rights, whether in land or in inventions. The success of the
9
nineteenth-century American patent system is some indication of this important insight.
Understanding the historical conveyance default rule in patent law is also
important because it underscores Epstein's critique of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics.10 In Quanta, the Court reframed this
conveyance default rule in patent law (known in patent law circles as "exhaustion
doctrine") into a mandatory rule that all conveyances exhaust a patentee's property
rights. I Epstein believes that the Quanta Court's new mandatory rule on exhaustion
undermines the effective security of property rights in patented inventions, 12 but his
critique was made without the benefit of an in-depth historical account of nineteenthcentury case law on patent conveyance rights. 13 The historical case law confirms that
the Quanta Court indeed shifted patent exhaustion doctrine from a default rule to a
mandatory rule. 14 This also raises the question as to why this easily discernible case law

8. See e.g. Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52

Hastings L.J. 1255 (2001).
9. See B. Zorina Khan, The Democratizationof Invention: Patentsand Copyrights in American Economic

Development, 1790-1920 9-10 (Cambridge U. Press 2005) ("The analysis [in this book] emphasizes the role
that patents and copyrights played in the securitization of ideas through the creation of tradeable assets:
intellectual property rights facilitated market exchange, a process that assigned value, helped to mobilize
capital, and improved the allocation of resources.... Extensive markets in patent rights allowed inventors to
extract returns from their activities through licensing and assigning or selling their rights.").
10. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). For a brief exposition of the facts in this case, see infra n. 20.
11. See id. at 2115 (holding "that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to
that item") (emphasis added).
12. Epstein, supran. 2, at 40-44.
13. See id. (discussing only twentieth-century exhaustion and antitrust cases).
14. There is a substantial literature on the distinction between default rules and mandatory rules. See e.g.
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549
(1989); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw through Arbitration, 83 Minn.

L.Rev. 703 (1999).
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has been so widely misunderstood today. Thus, this part concludes with a brief
discussion as to why the Quanta Court and many commentators are now confused about
the nature of the historical legal rules that comprise patent exhaustion doctrine.
Second, the article will discuss some complicating factors deriving from Epstein's
utilitarian commitment to rule-of-reason standards in antitrust and the impact that this
may have on a patentee's decision to engage in the inventive activity that leads to
innovative commercial practices within new markets. 15 Here, the concem is not with
default rules versus mandatory rules, but rather with rules versus standards; 16 in sum,
this part compares the conveyance default rule to standards-based antitrust review, both
of which are embraced by Epstein. Although there is a substantial body of scholarship
on the patent-antitrust nexus, the focus of this part is more delimited than in these many
monographs and articles. 17 This part makes only the following observation: the virtue of
the conveyance default rule, according to Epstein, is that it is a simple matter of
administration, but the gains of these low administration costs may be lost in the inherent
complexity in applying rule-of-reason antitrust analysis to pioneering inventions and
commercial innovation. The practical and theoretical difficulties in intermingling a rule
with a standard in adjudicating patent conveyances suggests that unforeseen and
of
potentially very large costs may be lurking in the background in Epstein's invocation
18
a standards-based antitrust regime as a backstop to a conveyance default rule.
A festschrift seems like a perfect opportunity to explore these two intertwined
issues of default rules versus mandatory rules in patent exhaustion doctrine and of rules
versus standards at the patent-antitrust nexus. The first issue confirms Epstein's policy
claims with solid empirical verification and the second issue raises friendly questions to
which he has the opportunity to respond. It bears emphasizing that it is not the goal here
to resolve any deep policy disputes concerning either patent exhaustion doctrine or the
antitrust-patent nexus. These are complex subjects each deserving of full-length
treatment in stand-alone articles or books. Given time and space constraints, the purpose
of this festschrift article is more limited in its scope. It first identifies historical doctrine
that provides some empirical support for Epstein's normative claim that conveyances of
patent rights should be governed by a default rule. It then highlights some concerns
about Epstein's utilitarian defense of a "restrained," standards-based antitrust review of
patent conveyances. 19 This raises the question whether such complicating factors
15. See Epstein, supran. 2, at 41-42 (noting the recent adoption of a "rule-of-reason analysis" for tie-ins in
antitrust law as an example of "the sensible approach to restraints on alienation in patents").
16. As with the distinction between default rules and mandatory rules, there is a substantial and
longstanding literature on the distinction between rules and standards. See e.g. Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. Leg. Stud. 257 (1974).
17. See e.g. Regulating Innovation: Competition Policy and Patent Law under Uncertainty (Geoffrey A.
Manne & Joshua D. Wright eds., Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2010); Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the
Patent-AntitrustParadox, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 761, (2002); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection-A
Reappraisal,97 Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1817 (1984); Ward S. Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and
Economic Appraisal (U. Chi. Law Press 1973).
18. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 577 (1992)
("Rules cost more to promulgate; standards cost more to enforce.").
19. See Epstein, supra n. 1, at 126 (observing that there are overall social "gains from a restrained and
sensible antitrust policy").
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undermine the social welfare benefits secured by the patent conveyance default rule. If
so, then this perhaps counsels against its use even in Epstein's second-best world of
simple rules for complex innovation.
II.

A SIMPLE DEFAULT RULE FOR PATENT CONVEYANCES

The correlation between the conveyance default rule in nineteenth-century patent
doctrine and Epstein's normative thesis that patent law should follow traditional common
law property rules concerning use and disposition is striking. His most in-depth analysis
of conveyance rules in patent law is found in his critique of the Supreme Court's patent
exhaustion decision in Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics.20 In sum, Epstein maintains
that the Quanta Court failed to acknowledge the property-based default rule that was
embedded within the doctrine concerning conveyances of property rights in inventions.
21
Although Epstein only identifies twentieth-century case law in support of this claim,
nineteenth-century courts indeed crafted a conveyance default rule for patents that they
imported from the concomitant treatment of conveyances of land, explicitly using
concepts and cases from common law property doctrine. Thus, this part will first discuss
this historical case law, and then it will discuss the Quantadecision and some reasons for
why the historical case law is eclipsed in modern court decisions and scholarship.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that nineteenth-century courts' framing
of patent conveyances in property terms should be unsurprising. As I have established in
my previous scholarship, early American courts relied on the legal classification of
patents as "property" to link patents with real property in both conceptual and rhetorical
terms. For instance, courts identified patents as "titles, ' 22 conveyance instruments as
"deed[s]," 23 concurrent patent-owners as "tenants in common,' 24 and patent infringers
as "pirates. ' 25 This was not just rhetoric, as nineteenth-century courts substantively

20. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at 42-44. Epstein was no stranger to Quanta, as he joined an amicus brief
authored by Scott Kieff, Troy Paredes, and Polk Wagner, arguing that patent exhaustion doctrine should be
construed as a conveyance default rule. See Br. of Various L. Profs. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respt.,
Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109. This case arose from a somewhat complicated license agreement
between LG Electronics and Intel Corporation, in which LG licensed its computer patents to Intel but
prohibited Intel from selling any memory chips covered by these patents to computer manufacturers who would
combine these patented memory chips with non-Intel products. In exchange for LG's promise not to hold Intel
liable for patent infringement if a computer manufacturer breached this restrictive condition, Intel agreed to
provide notice of this limitation in its license to its customers (i.e., the computer manufacturers who produce
personal computers using Intel chips). Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2114-15. The exact terms of the
agreement between LG and Intel proved to be a nettlesome issue in this litigation, because the license was
under seal and thus only portions of it were made available in the court decision. See id at 2114 n. 1.
Quanta Computers was one of several computer manufacturers who received this notice, but nonetheless
combined the LG-patented Intel chips with non-Intel products. LG sued Quanta and the other computer
manufacturers for patent infringement. The Supreme Court granted cert on two questions, the most important
of which was whether downstream third-parties could be held liable for patent infringement given their breach
of a restrictive condition between a patentee and a licensee. The Court was clear that the answer was no,
holding "that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item." Id. at 2115.
21. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at 40-44.
22. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
"Privilege" in HistoricalContext, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 953, 994 (2007).
23. Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. 324, 326 (1810) (noting in a patent dispute that "whole [interest] passed at law by
the deed of assignment").
24. Mossoff, supran. 22, at 994-95.
25. Id. at 993.
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relied on common law property cases to create early patent doctrines, such as applying to
patents the interpretative canons used for construing title deeds 26 and extending
constitutional protections to patentees under the Takings Clause. 27 One could thus
safely predict that nineteenth-century courts would apply the same conveyance rules in
common law property doctrine to secure to patentees their rights to use and dispose of
their inventions, which is exactly what happened in early American patent law.
A.

The Conveyance Default Rule in Nineteenth-CenturyPatentDoctrine

28
Although Congress has never codified exhaustion doctrine in the patent statutes,
this does not diminish its importance in securing to patentees their property rights in their
inventions, In essence, exhaustion doctrine has long defined the methods by which a
patentee may restrict the downstream commercial use or sale of his property. As first
developed in nineteenth-century case law, exhaustion doctrine established a
straightforward default rule: if a patentee conveys his property rights through
unrestricted licenses or sales of his patented products, the patentee thereby exhausts his
ability to enforce his property rights in his invention. After an outright sale of his
property, the patentee can no longer sue for infringement because he no longer has any
property right on which to assert a legal claim for infringement.
For real estate lawyers, exhaustion doctrine should sound familiar, and this is no
accident. In the nineteenth century, American courts expressly patterned exhaustion
29
doctrine after the same default rule that they had crafted in real property law.
Traditional property law provides that a landowner who conveys his legal rights in land
without express restrictions, creating a lesser estate or imposing defeasible conditions,
conveys his entire estate interest.30 In other words, since an owner of real property
controls the exclusive determination of its use and disposition, the property-owner may
convey his estate with some restrictions on its future use. Absent any express use
restrictions in a conveyance instrument, courts deem a property-owner to have conveyed
his entire estate. 3 1 In the nineteenth century, courts were developing this conveyance
default rule for real property, 32 and thus it made sense to them to apply it equally to
patents, making the necessary adjustments for the fact that the "thing" in patent law is
not a parcel of land but a novel and useful invention.

26. Id. at998-1001.
27. See Adam Mossoff, Patents as ConstitutionalPrivate Property: The Historical Protection of Patents
Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 689, 718-19 (2007).
28. Interestingly, exhaustion doctrine in copyright law was also judge-made law. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Congress has since codified it in the copyright statutes. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(2006).
29. See Adam Mossoff, CommercializingPropertyRights in Inventions: Lessonsfor Modern Patent Theory
from Classic Patent Doctrine, in Regulating Innovation, supra n. 17, at _ (forthcoming). The material in this
section presents some new historical material on patent exhaustion doctrine, but it is largely based on this
earlier work.
30. See Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 294 (Aspen Law & Bus. 2001) ("Today, a
conveyance is assumed to transfer all the rights that the owner possesses to the grantee unless the conveyance
suggests otherwise.").
31. See Thompson on Real Propertyvol. 2, § 17.06(d) (David A. Thomas ed., Michie Co. 1994) ("Where
language is ambiguous, it will be construed to confer on the grantee the highest estate permissible under the
instrument.").
32. See infra nn. 58-59 and accompanying text.
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It is important to recognize that courts secured to patentees their right to convey
their legal interests in their inventions because patents were classified as property rights.
In contrast with an English patent, which was legally defined as a grant of personal
33
privilege and therefore "inalienable unless power to that effect is given by the crown,"
an American patent was "defined as an incorporeal chattel" that reflected "all the
characteristics of personal estate." 34 This included the core rights to use and dispose of
one's property; as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed in 1823, "property, without
the power of use and disposition, is an empty sound.,, 35 One nineteenth-century court
thus made the almost banal observation at the time that "the rights conferred by the
patent law, being property, have the incidents of property, and are capable of being
transmitted by descent or devise, or assigned by grant." 36 In a historical context in
which courts distinguished between the legal treatment of special franchise grants and
fundamental property rights, the classification of patents as fundamental civil rights in
property directly determined how courts protected patentees in using and selling their
37

property.
On the basis of this conceptual delineation of patents as property, early American
courts incorporated from property doctrine the same conceptual terms that the common
law courts had long used to identify the quantum of interest conveyed by a propertyowner to a third-party. This is best evidenced in a survey of patent conveyance concepts
38
In this case, the defendants claimed that an extremely
in 1858 in Potter v. Holland.
complicated set of back-and-forth conveyances between multiple parties resulted in the
plaintiff lacking standing to sue for patent infringement, and thus the Pottercourt found
it "necessary to determine what is meant by the terms assignee of the original patent, and
assignment of the original patent, as they are used in the patent law." 39 In fact, the
complexity of the conveyances underlying the dispute in Potterappears to be the primary
factor in motivating the court to discuss these conveyance concepts, 40 because, prior to
this case, the enforcement of assignments or licenses did not garner much comment or
concern. In 1813, for instance, Justice Joseph Story summarized an earlier patent case in
which a plaintiffs claim was dismissed for lack of standing on the grounds that the
conveyance instrument was, "technically speaking, no assignment of the patent right"
because it "operate[ed] as a covenant or license for the exclusive use of the patent right
41
in certain local districts."
Given the complexity of the conveyances underlying the dispute in Potter, the
court thus reviewed the longstanding distinction in property law between an assignment
and a license. On one hand, the court explained that "[a]n assignment, as understood by

33. Belding v. Turner, 3 F. Cas. 84, 85 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (the quotation is from an anonymous note
following the case).
34. Id.
35. In re Appeal ofFlintham, 1I Serg. & Rawle 16, 24 (Pa. 1823).
36. Carew v. Boston Elastic FabricCo., 5 F. Cas. 56, 57 (C.C. Mass. 1871).
37. See Mossoff, supra n. 22, at 989-1009.
38. 19 F. Cas. 1154 (C.C. Conn. 1858).
39. Id. at 1156.
40. Id. at 1154-1555 (describing the multiple conveyances between multiple parties).
41. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1120-21 (C.C. Mass. 1813) (discussing Tyler, 10 U.S. 324).
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the common law, is a parting with the whole property. 'A 2 On the other hand, a "license,"
another well-known concept in real property doctrine, 43 created a lesser interest in a
patent. As the court observed, a "licensee is one who has [had] transferred to him, in
writing or orally, a less or different interest than either the interest in the whole patent, or
less than an undivided part in the whole." 44 In short, licenses were limited conveyances
of only some of the legal interests in property, whether land or an invention, and
assignments were a conveyance of the entire estate. 45 (Notably, these concepts continue
to be used by courts in patent law cases to this day. 46) Later in its lengthy opinion, the
Potter court explained that "certain exclusive rights are secured, or purported to be
secured to the inventor" by a patent, 4 7 and its survey of the legal classification of patent
conveyances made clear that this included the central property rights of use, enjoyment
and disposition.
On the basis of this conceptual linkage between property in land and in inventions,
nineteenth-century American courts developed the same default rule for patent
conveyances as had been employed for real property. In sum, courts incorporated into
patent law the right to impose restrictions that had been secured to landowners through
the enforcement of restrictive covenants and defeasible estates. 4 8 Patentees were able to
impose a whole litany of restrictions on the use of the property interest they conveyed to
a licensee. For instance, a patentee could restrict a licensee in terms of the total quantity
of patented products manufactured or sold,4 9 the manner in which the patented product
may be used,5 ° the territorial scope in which the patented product may be used or sold,51

42. Potter,19 F. Cas. at 1156 (citing William Blackstone, Commentaries vol. 2, *326).
43. See James Kent, Commentaries on American Law vol. 2, 452-53 (George Comstock ed., 11 th ed.,
Little, Brown & Co. 1866) (explaining that "a license is an authority to do a particular act, or series of acts,
upon another's land, without possessing any estate therein").
44. Potter,19F. Cas. at 1157.
45. See Suydam v. Day, 23 F. Cas. 473, 474 (C.C.N.Y. 1845) (distinguishing between "an assignee of a
patent [who] must be regarded as acquiring his title to it, with a right of action in his own name," and "an
interest in only a part of each patent, to wit, a license to use").
46. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("A conveyance of legal title by
the patentee... is an assignment and vests the assignee with title in the patent, and a right to sue infringers.");
In re CyberneticServices, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting "that a security interest in a patent
that does not involve a transfer of the rights of ownership is a 'mere license'.
47. Potter, 19 F. Cas. at 1158.
48. See e.g. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (noting proposition in patent law that
"[pl]urchasers of the exclusive privilege of making or vending the patented machine hold the whole or a portion
");
Am. Cotton Tie
of the franchise which the patent secures, depending upon the nature of the conveyance ....
Supply Co. v. Bullard, 1 F. Cas. 625, 629 (C.C.N.Y. 1879) (recognizing that patented products may be sold in
which "a restriction may easily be attached, or where a license to use only may be sold, unaccompanied with
any title or accompanied with a restricted title"); Washing Mach. Co. v. Earle, 29 F. Cas. 332, 334 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1861) ("Every person who pays the patentee for a license to use his process becomes the owner of the
product, and may sell it to whom he pleases, or apply it to any purpose, unless he bind himself by covenants to
restrict his right of making and vending certain articles that may interfere with the special business of some
other licensees.") (emphasis added).
49. See e.g. Charles Slack, Noble Obsession: Charles Goodyear, Thomas Hancock, and The Race to Unlock
the Greatest IndustrialSecret of the Nineteenth Century (Hyperion 2002) (describing quantity, territorial, and
field-of-use restrictions that Goodyear imposed on licensees of his patent for vulcanized rubber); Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 554 (1852) (Mclean, J., dissenting) (describing a license among the parties, which
they were not disputing, to make and use a patented planning machine "within Pittsburgh and Alleghany
county ...[and] not to contruct or run more than fifty machines during the term").
50. See e.g. Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882) (enforcing license restriction prohibiting
re-use of a patented cotton-bale tie, on which the patented products were stamped "License to use once only");
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and even the price that the licensee could charge in the marketplace. 52 By the end of the
nineteenth century, it was well-settled doctrine that patentees could convey lesser
invention "subject
interests in their patents to grantees, who took "title" to the underlying
53
to a reverter in case of violation of the conditions of the sale."
In such cases, a patentee retained something tantamount to a reversionary interest
arising from the creation of a lesser estate, a point underscored by courts using such
terms as "reverter" in referring to a patentee's retained property interests. 54 Similar to
real property doctrine, it was this reversionary interest that gave a patentee the right to
sue a licensee for patent infringement to enforce his retained property rights.
federal court explained in 1857:

As a

If such licensee uses the patented invention beyond the limits of the license or grant, or in a
way not authorized by the license or grant, then there has been a violation of a right
secured to the patentee under a law of the United States giving to him the exclusive right to
such licensee performs, according to their terms, all the
use the thing patented, although
5
covenants entered into by him.
If a licensee used a patented invention beyond the terms of the interest conveyed to
him by the patentee, he was liable for the same reason that an owner of an easement who
expands the right of way is liable for trespassing on the larger estate. 56 If a patentee
expressly retained an interest in conveyances of his property, as evidenced by restrictions
imposed on the licensee in the conveyance instrument, then the patentee could sue his
licensee for infringement.
Although nineteenth-century courts did not explicitly frame their development of
patent conveyance doctrine as a property-based default rule, they did make clear in
Potter and in other cases that they were employing the same concepts they had long used
in real estate conveyances. 57 On the basis of recognizing this conceptual symmetry
between patents and real estate, it is possible to see that they were recreating in patent
law the same conveyance default rule that they were developing in real property
In the nineteenth century, the common law presumption that favored
doctrine.
conveyances of lesser estates in land was beginning to be replaced with a new default

Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 799-800 (1869) (enforcing against the defendants the
express sale and use restrictions imposed in a license); Chaffee v. Bos. Belting Co., 63 U.S. 217, 220 (1859)
(recognizing by "the terms of the instrument" created by Goodyear in this case that "it was understood that the
right and license so conveyed was to apply to any and all articles substituted for leather, metal, and other
substances, in the use or manufacture of machines or machinery ....).
51. See e.g. McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 554 (describing a valid assignment of the patent "within several States,
including Pennsylvania, except the city of Philadelphia"); Farrington v. Gregory, 8 F. Cas. 1088, 1089
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1870) (noting that license contained geographic restriction that limited the licensee's "right to
use and sell machines in Calhoun and Kalamazoo counties, in the state of Michigan ... .
52. See e.g. E. Bement & Sons v. Nall. Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 75 (1902).
53. Heaton-PeninsularButton-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 290 (6th Cir. 1896)
(recognizing under the terms of the license that "[t]he buyer of the machine undoubtedly obtains the title to the
materials embodying the invention, subject to a reverter in case of violation of the conditions of the sale").
54. Id.
55. Goodyearv. Union IndiaRubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 726, 727 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857).
56. See Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 518 (Wash. 1986) (Dore, J., dissenting) (noting that "any extension of
the use of an easement to benefit a nondominant estate constitutes misuse of the easement," and thereby "is a
trespass").
57. See supra nn. 36-53 and accompanying text.
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rule: if a fee simple owner transfers an interest outright without express limitations or
fails to use the proper estate terminology, then it is deemed to be a conveyance of the
entire estate in fee. 58 Today, in conveyances of real property, a fee simple owner has the
right to transfer lesser estates or impose use restrictions, but he has to do so expressly
and in writing (employing formal "words of limitation"). 59 Without the use of express
words of limitation indicating an intent to transfer a lesser estate or to impose defeasible
60
conditions, the default presumption is that the grantee receives the estate in fee simple.
Since the nineteenth century, the same has been true in conveyances of patent
rights. A patentee may grant a license by imposing in writing limitations on the interest
conveyed to the grantee, which creates as a matter of logical necessity a retained
reversionary interest in the patentee. 6 1 However, if a patentee failed to do this, then the
conveyance was deemed to be an outright transfer of the patentee's interests and he
retained nothing under the law that permitted him to sue on his property right. 62 In fact,
nineteenth-century courts repeatedly rebuffed attempts by patentees to sue either
innocent end-users who lacked notice of use-restrictions or grantees who had received
interests in a patent free and clear of any express words of limitation. 63 By 1874, a
federal appeals court could state without controversy the well-established law governing
patent licenses: "It is clear that the patentee may grant the right to use within any
specified place, town, city or district, and he may make such right of use exclusive; and I
deem it no less clear that he may limit the right to manufacture for such use." 64 In such
declarations it is clear that nineteenth-century courts developed the same conveyance
default rules for both land and patents-because both were secured as property within
the American legal system.
58. See Stevens v. Dewing, 2 Vt. 411, 416-17 (1830) (holding that a deed conveyed a fee simple, despite
express words indicating a conveyance of a lesser interest, given the tenor of the "whole deed" in favor of a
fee). At common law, grantors were required to use precise words of limitation to convey a fee simple;
otherwise, the default rule was that they conveyed only a life estate. See e.g. Wright v. Denn, 23 U.S. 204,
227-28 (1825) (noting that "where there are no words of limitation to a devise, the general rule of law is, that
the devisee takes an estate for life only, unless, from the language there used, or from other parts of the will,
there is a plain intention to give a larger estate"). In most jurisdictions, this common law default rule favoring
life estates has been abrogated by statute and case law in favor of the modem default rule favoring fee simples.
See Sheldon F. Kurtz, Moynihan 's Introductionto the Law of Real Property39 (4th ed., West 2005).
59. Id.at 36-37 ("Words of limitation are those words defining or denoting the quantum of interest given to
the grantee.").
60. See William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Real Property29 (3d ed., West 2000) ("Any
language in a deed of conveyance or a will sufficient to create a fee simple will create a fee simple absolute in
the absence of any legally effective provision for defeasance upon the happening of a stated event.").
61. See e.g. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (referring to a patent conveyance as "an
express license or grant ...giving the defendants a right to the continued use of the invention"); HeatonPeninsular,77 F. at 290 (recognizing that "[a]ll alienations of a mere right to use the invention operate only as
licenses," and that in such cases, the interest conveyed to a licensee was "subject to a reverter in case of
violation of the conditions of the sale"); Gamewell Fire-Alarm Telegraph Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 14 F. 255,
256 (C.C.N.Y. 1882) (dismissing a licensee's lawsuit as going beyond the scope of the limited rights of use and
sale granted to it by the patentee).
62. See e.g. Featherstonev. Ormonde Cycle Co., 53 F. 110, 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) ("It is well settled
that the unrestrictedsale of a patented article by the owner of the patent conveys to the purchaser the right of
unrestricted ownership ....") (emphasis added); Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885)
("When the [patent] owner sells an article, without any reservationrespecting its use ...the purchaser acquires
the whole right of the vendor in the thing sold .. ")(emphasis added).
63. See Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in PatentLaw, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321, 359 (2009)
(identifying case law).
64. Dorsey Revolving HarvesterRake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 7 F. Cas. 946, 947 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874).
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In the twentieth century, this conveyance default rule came to be known as
exhaustion doctrine, emphasizing more the default aspect of the rule rather than the right
of patentees to convey lesser interests through licenses. Despite this new label, though,
the doctrinal content of the default rule remained the same: a patentee exhausted his
property rights in his invention if he conveyed his property without "explicit and
unequivocal restrictions as to the time, or place, or manner of using the [patented]
article" that created some type of reversionary interest. 6 5 As summarized in an early
twentieth-century patent case, "the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional
sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law and
66
rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.'
Although the "exhaustion" language was different than that used by nineteenth-century
courts, the substantive content of the doctrine remained the same. In fact, one early
twentieth-century court observed that exhaustion doctrine simply reflected "truisms"
concerning the right of conveyance. 67 It was and should have remained a simple
conveyance default rule.
B.

The Confusion among Modern Courts and Commentators Concerning the
Foundationsof Exhaustion Doctrine

Historical patent case law confirms Epstein's criticism that Quanta is "a pure
exercise in idle formalism. ' 68 This critique has bite, because the Quanta Court redefines
exhaustion doctrine from a default rule into a mandatory rule "that the initial authorized
sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item." 69 This statement of
exhaustion doctrine is anything but a conditional rule: If all sales exhaust all patent
rights, then imposing restrictive conditions in a license or sale would not change this
fact. To dispel any doubts, the Quanta Court repeatedly restates exhaustion doctrine as a
mandatory rule, not a default rule. 70 Although the Court cites nineteenth-century
exhaustion cases in support of its mandatory rule, 7 1 it fails to recognize that its
exhaustion rule conflicts with the actual default rule within the historical case law it
claims to be relying on.
For the purpose of this section, I will briefly explore two possible explanations for
the Quanta Court's confusion in redefining patent exhaustion doctrine into a mandatory
rule, one based in historical case law and the other based in the modem patent statutes.

65. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Engr. Corp., 266 F. 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1920).
66. Motion PicturePat. Co. v. UniversalFilm Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917) (emphasis added).
67. See Am. Graphophone Co. v. Bos. Store of Chi., 225 F. 785, 787 (N.D. Il. 1915) (observing as
"truisms" that "after a patentee has exhausted his right, he can no longer exercise it, or that, when he has once
sold to an individual for a full price, the public cannot be barred from the full and unrestricted use and right of
resale").
68. Epstein, supra n. 2, at 43.
69. Quanta Computer,Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2115.
70. See id. at 2121 ("Exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder."); id. at 2122
("The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights and
prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.").
71. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2115 (citing Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,455 (1873)) ('The
longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates
all patent rights to that item."); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 351 (1863); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453,
455-56 (1873)).
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The point here is not reductionist, however, as the limitation to these two reasons is for
purposes of time and scope only. There may be other possible reasons rooted in both
policy and doctrine, as such explanations are not exclusive of each other, but this would
require a more in-depth analysis in an article in its own right.
First, the Quanta Court might have been led astray by its purported reliance on
nineteenth-century case law. Unfortunately, patent exhaustion doctrine is mistakenly
identified today as having been born at the hands of Chief Justice Robert Taney in his
1852 decision in Bloomer v. MeQuewan.72 This is problematic if only because Chief
Justice Taney was a fervent Jacksonian Democrat 73 who believed that patents were
monopolies that impeded free competition. 74 Thus, he felt that patents should be strictly
limited in the same way as other exclusive franchise grants, such as bridge monopolies. 75
As a result of his view of patents as state-granted monopolies, Chief Justice Taney spoke
in Bloomer about how the patent secures only the right to exclude provided in any stategranted "franchise, ' 76 which led him to use broad mandatory language that once the
sells it, the patented invention "is no
owner of this "exclusive privilege" or "franchise"
77
longer within the limits of the monopoly."
The myopic focus today on these portions of Chief Justice Taney's Bloomer
opinion has misled courts and commentators as to the historical foundations of patent
exhaustion doctrine. Many do not realize that, in 1852, these words were unbridled
judicial activism, as Taney was rewriting the express terms of the patent statutes in force
at that time. Contrary to his claim in Bloomer that the "franchise which the patent
grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude," the 1836 Patent Act expressly secured
the substantive property rights to use, enjoy, and dispose of a patented invention. 78 Even
more important, Chief Justice Taney had an idiosyncratic view of patents because most
other antebellum justices, judges, and commentators maintained that patents were
fundamental civil rights securing 79important property rights, not special monopoly
franchise grants issued by the state.
Before and after Bloomer, patent exhaustion doctrine evolved at the hands of the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts as a traditional property conveyance default
rule. 80
As such, follow-on patent exhaustion decisions rightly treated Taney's
mandatory language as dicta, citing Bloomer only for the proposition that a conveyance
can extinguish property rights in certain circumstances. They then proceeded to apply

72. 55 U.S. 539. Justice Thomas's opinion in Quantaprovides the latest example of this historical myopia.
See e.g. Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2115 ("This Court first applied the [exhaustion] doctrine in 19thcentury cases addressing patent extensions on the Woodworth planing machine.") (citing McQuewan, 55 U.S.
539).
73. See Mossoff, supra n. 22, at 966 (noting Taney's commitment to Jacksonian Democracy).
74. See id at 1000 (discussing Taney's judicial treatment of patents within the context of his inherent
suspicion of all government grants of exclusive rights, such as corporate charters, franchises, and patents).
75. See CharlesRiver Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 536-53 (1837).
76. McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549.
77. Id.
78. See Mossoff, supra n. 63, at 340-42 (discussing definition of patents as property rights in 1836 Patent
Act and situating this definition within its relevant historical context).
79. See generally Mossoff, supra n. 22 (discussing the dominant conception of patents in the early
American Republic as property rights justified as "privileges" (civil rights) by natural rights philosophy).
80. See supra Part II, A.
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the concepts from real property law concerning lesser estates or defeasible conditions.
The Bloomer dicta, though, continues to mislead modem courts and scholars, who
rely on it too much and to the exclusion of the rest of the nineteenth-century case law.
This is perhaps a result of the new "exhaustion" language in modern case law, which
emphasizes more the limits on rather than the rights of patentees in using or disposing of
their property. 8 1 Again, the briefing and decision in Quanta exemplifies this confusion.
Solicitor General Paul Clement's amicus brief in the case relied heavily on Bloomer to
argue in favor of a mandatory rule that all sales exhausted a patentee's property rights
regardless of any express conditions set forth in the license agreement. 82 Similarly,
Quanta cited Bloomer to justify his own embrace of a
Justice Thomas's opinion in 83
mandatory rule on exhaustion.
Second, the Quanta Court may have been misled by the modern redefinition of
patents as personal property, 84 as opposed to the earlier treatment of patents as sharing
attributes of both real estate and chattels. 85 This has led some scholars to the
anachronistic view that patent exhaustion doctrine reflects traditional judicial hostility to
use restrictions on chattels, 86 imposing on historical case law the concerns about limits
captured in the modern "exhaustion" label. There is perhaps a selection bias at work
here as well, as the historical Supreme Court cases highlighted by modem scholars are
those in which patentees overreached in their infringement claims against downstream
users of their inventions given conveyance instruments that lacked restrictive conditions
supporting the infringement claims or where there was failure to provide reasonable
notice. 8 7 As such, modern commentators have not recognized the omnipresent
conceptual, normative, and doctrinal correlations between patents and real property
within the relevant nineteenth-century case law. At that time, courts drew explicit
fundamental connections between property rights in land and inventions-each type of
property served the function of securing the exclusive rights of use, enjoyment and

81. See Shubha Ghosh, Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, The Quandry of Quanta: Thoughts on the
Supreme CourtDecision One Week Later, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof blog (June 17, 2008)
(observing that Quanta "goes a long way in limiting a patent owner's ability to reach past the initial transaction
and control downstream users and purchasers of patented products").
82. See Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petrs. 5-11, Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109
(repeatedly citing McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 in arguing for a per se rule that "a patentee who sells an article
embodying the invention (either directly or through an authorized licensee) cannot bring a patent-infringement
suit against the purchasers for using the article for its only reasonable use or for reselling the article to others").
83. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2115 ("The longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion
provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.").
84. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("patents shall have the attributes of personal property").
85. As noted above, it was commonplace for early American courts to use real property concepts and
doctrines in patent law cases. See supra nn. 36-72 and accompanying text. Some antebellum courts went even
further in their comparisons between inventions and land. One federal court observed that "[a]n inventor holds
a property in his invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock." Hovey v. Henry, 12 F.
Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846); see also Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(observing that patents "protect intellectual property, the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much
a man's own, and as much the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears").
86. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 911-14 (2008) (discussing
courts' alleged reluctance in historical patent cases in enforcing restrictive covenants).
87. See id. See also Shubha Ghosh, Carte Blanche, Quanta, and Competition Policy, 34 J. Corp. L. 1209,
1229-34 (2009) (providing broadly framed summary of nineteenth-century cases in support of claim that
"exhaustion is a mandatory rule").
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88

disposition.
In employing his rough rule-utilitarian metric in assessing legal rules, Epstein
sidesteps this historical and doctrinal confusion and endorses on normative grounds a
conveyance default rule for patents. Yet the historical case law provides substantial
descriptive support for his normative thesis, although nineteenth-century courts may not
have embraced his utilitarianism and instead preferred the more traditional natural rights
justification for their legal rules. 89 This normative foundation for the conveyance default
rule ensured that courts secured to those inventors who created new and valuable
products the fruits of their labors, as well as ensuring the maximum liberty possible in
using and disposing of these valuable products. 91 Epstein prefers instead his rough,
second-best utilitarian justification for this simple default rule, but that does not change
the fact that he is correct in his (descriptive) claim that the Quanta Court has
fundamentally changed patent conveyance doctrine.
III.

ANTITRUST AS A COMPLICATING FACTOR IN A SECOND-BEST WORLD

As noted in the introduction, Epstein does not base his advocacy for a conveyance
default rule on historical or doctrinal grounds. Rather, he grounds such a legal rule in his
overall utilitarian theory of legal entitlements. According to Epstein, the best that we can
hope for are legal rules that "have the virtue of offering solutions for 90 to 95 percent of
all possible situations. Never ask more from a legal system." 92 In this second-best
world, a conveyance default rule best maximizes overall social utility. Yet there is
potential tension between his rough utilitarian defense of this simple rule in patent law
and his belief that there are overall social "gains from a restrained and sensible antitrust
policy." 93 The purpose of this part is to highlight this tension between the social gains
achieved through a simple conveyance default rule and the potential social losses in the
use of antitrust in policing some aspects of patent conveyances.
At the outset, though, it is necessary to acknowledge that the patent-antitrust nexus
has long been fraught with theoretical and doctrinal tension. Courts and scholars initially
struggled to find a harmonious balance between what they saw as an inherent conflict
between the "monopolies" secured by the Patent Act and the "monopolies" sanctioned
by the federal antitrust statutes. 94 More recently, many courts and commentators have
88. See generally Mossoff, supra n. 22, at 1000 (discussing how patents were justified as property rights in
the early American Republic, identified at that time as "privileges" (civil rights) within natural rights
philosophy); Mossoff, supra n. 27, at 715-19 (discussing how the natural rights justification for patents led
courts to extend to them constitutional protection as "private property" under the Takings Clause).
89. For my analysis of the strong historical influence of natural rights philosophy in American patent
doctrine, see id
90. See Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 155 (2002).
91. Cf Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American PropertyLaw, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 889, 910 (2009)
("Individual humans need not only such basic external goods as food and the raw materials for clothes and
shelter but also a domain of discretion in which they may be left alone to use those external assets productively
for their own self-preservation.").
92. Epstein, supra n. 1, at 42.
93. Id. at 126.
94. See Louis Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks & Monopolies § 4:55 (4th ed., West
2008) (recognizing "a basic policy conflict between the two statutes-the one that creates, and the other that
forbids, monopolies"); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust 505-06 (West 1977) (noting that "there [can] be no
pretense that the patent system is not in potential collision with antitrust"); U.S. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle.
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come to recognize that both legal doctrines seek to advance social welfare by
safeguarding innovation and competition. 95 It would be impossible within the scope of
this festschrift article, let alone only one part of this article, to weigh in on this important
theoretical dispute, and that is certainly not the goal here. Thus, what follows is a more
limited claim: the virtue of the conveyance default rule, according to Epstein, is that it is
a simple matter of administration, but the gains of these low administration costs may be
lost in the inherent complexity in applying rule-of-reason antitrust analysis to pioneering
inventions and commercial innovation. This may be a problem for Epstein given his
grounding of a simple conveyance default rule on his overall commitment to
"sensible" use of
utilitarianism, which also leads him to embrace at the margins the
96
efficiency-maximization.
ensuring
for
mechanism
antitrust as a legal
Consistent with his underlying commitment to cost-benefit analysis, Epstein
97
generally rejects per se illegality rules in antitrust, and instead advances rule-of-reason
98
But a rule-ofstandards, especially at the interface between patent and antitrust law.
reason standard mandates that courts engage in highly granular assessments of extremely
novel business models and commercial practices. This inherently ex post antitrust
review potentially threatens to undermine the ex ante advantages of certainty provided
by the simple conveyance default rule governing the disposition of one's patented
invention in the marketplace. This may be the case for two reasons, one having to do
with the interplay between rules and standards in litigation and the other having to do
with the seemingly unpredictable nature of innovation.
A.

The Effect of InterminglingConveyance Rules and Antitrust Standards

The first concern about directing courts to look to antitrust to squelch specific
cases of collusion or monopolization is that, in practice, litigants always assert antitrust
claims against patentees or their assignees. This suggests that the conveyance default
rule will become swamped by standards-based adjudication of antitrust claims. This is
not mere conjecture, as there are many instances in the law in which a doctrine that
originally contained both standards and rules evolved through adjudication to the point

m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that a patent "grant is in inevitable tension with the
general hostility against monopoly expressed in the antitrust laws").
95. See Bowman, supra n. 17, at I (claiming that antitrust and patent law both seek "to maximize wealth by
producing what consumers want at the lowest cost"); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 Antitrust L.J. 167 (1997); Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (recognizing a complementary
relationship between patent law and antitrust because "both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and
competition").
96. Epstein, supran. 1, at 126.
97. See Richard A. Epstein, Monopolization Follies: The Dangers of StructuralRemedies under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. 205, 223 (2009) ("The most destructive trope in Alcoa was Leamed
Hand's soaring rhetoric on the necessity of per se illegality even when all the direct evidence suggests that the
particular scheme might make economic sense."); Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things Apply":
Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1288, 1296 (2002) ("[1)n antitrust
law, it is possible to regard certain offenses as per se illegal (at least as a first approximation, usually done with
price fixing and market division), and others as subject to a rule of reason (often the approach applied to tie-ins
and other vertical arrangements).").
98. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at ins. 41-42 (noting the recent adoption of a "rule-of-reason analysis" for tieins in antitrust law as an example of "the sensible approach to restraints on alienation in patents").
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that the standards eventually trumped the rules as the defining content of the doctrine.
Property law is replete with such examples, especially in our post-legal-realist world in
which formalistic common law rules have been slowly replaced with context-sensitive
standards.
One prominent example of this interplay between rules and standards is regulatory
takings doctrine, which is also a legal field that is near and dear to Epstein's
scholarship. 99 In fact, Epstein's work in this area helped spark a "takings revolution"
that reached its apex in 1992 when the Supreme Court announced a new per se rule in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission: a taking occurs "where [a] regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land." 100 In dissent, Justice
Stevens observed that the per se rule would lead to one of two results: either it would
replace the standards-based regulatory takings test (known as the Penn Central
inquiry) 10 1 or it would be relegated to serving as a rare exception to the primary
application of the Penn Central inquiry. 102 By the turn of the century, it was clear that
the Lucas rule had in fact become only an "extraordinarily limited exception to the multifactor balancing test first enunciated in Penn Central," applying in those "exceedingly
rare circumstances in which every conceivable productive use of private property has
been wiped out in both space and time." 10 3 As an unanimous Court declared in 2005.
"[t]he Penn Central factors-though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary
questions-have served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings
' 10 4
claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules."
Constitutional law is admittedly a complex example, raising a host of non-property
policy concerns, but there are many similar instances of this tension between rules and
standards in more run-of-the-mill property doctrines. In easements, for example, the law
governing whether an owner of a dominant tenement has improperly expanded the scope
of an easement is directly on point. Here, the longstanding rule was that any expansion
10 5
in the scope of an easement was a per se trespass of the servient tenement's estate.
There is also a standards-based exception to this rule, providing that "[t]he manner,
frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of
developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant
estate." 10 6 Of course, in litigation, owners of dominant tenements always argue that an
expansion in scope is necessary to accommodate normal development or, as one
hornbook puts it, that the change is "reasonably foreseeable." 10 7 The practical result is
99. See Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect: How to Revive Constitutional Protection for Private
Property (Oxford U. Press 2008); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (Harv. U. Press 1985).
100. Lucas v. S.C. CoastalCouncil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
101. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City ofN. Y, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
102. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Adam Mossoff, Foreword: The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban
Development after County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 837, 838-39.
104. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
105. See Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 518 (Wash. 1986) (Dore, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny extension of the use
of an easement to benefit a nondominant estate constitutes a misuse of the easement. Misuse of an easement is
a trespass.").
106. Restatement (Third) of Property:Servitudes § 4.10 (2000).
107. Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property vol. 3, § 34.12[2] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew
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that after a perfunctory statement of the per se rule, courts now discuss at great length the
detailed circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement, the nature of the new
use, and the development of the surrounding area to determine if the dominant
tenement's owner's actions are acceptable under the standard of reasonableness. 108 The
standards-based exception, given its nature as a fact-sensitive, contextualized legal test,
has come to dominate the case law governing the scope of an easement. In effect, this is
a doctrine in which a standards-based exception has replaced the central governing rule.
With these and other doctrines in mind, 109 the concern here is that a conveyance
default rule will ultimately be sidelined in practice by standards-based rule-of-reason
antitrust analysis. Admittedly, Epstein embraces antitrust for only a minimal number of
cases in which patentees act strategically in exploiting the conveyance default rule,
leading to cartels or monopolization. But in practice, the parties opposing the patentee
will invariably raise the antitrust claims in every relevant case-whether this opposing
party is a licensee charged with breach, an alleged infringer, a competitor, or the
government, there are more than enough opportunities for this to occur in innumerable
court cases. The pragmatic litigator always knows that he just might succeed in
convincing the court to find an antitrust violation in the patentee's complex and novel
commercial practices. Even if the antitrust claims fall short of success in a favorable
court judgment, the claims give the opposing party greater leverage against the patentee,
as such claims (or counter-claims) are simply one more way to impose additional
transaction costs on the patentee in defending his property rights. The patentee now has
to deal with the additional discovery demands arising from the antitrust claims, as well as
assess the probabilities of success at trial as part of the overall cost-benefit analysis in
determining whether to settle or not.
This omnipresent pragmatic justification for asserting antitrust claims against
patentees portends badly for the long-term survival of the conveyance default rule in
Epstein's second-best world in which rule-of-reason antitrust analysis should merely
police the boundaries of the doctrine. Instead, the conveyance default rule, which is
intended to address the majority of cases with some ease, will eventually become
replaced with case-sensitive standards that were originally intended to provide only
minor corrections at the periphery of the doctrine. As Epstein has written in the context
of antitrust review of commercial uses of pharmaceutical patents, "[i]f the public
believes that all innovation is a subterfuge [for anti-competitive behaviors],
pharmaceutical companies will constantly litigate into a head wind." 110 This is true not
just for drug patents; patentees are always going to litigate into an antitrust head wind,
especially when the federal government ramps up its antitrust enforcement efforts, as it
has done under the Obama Administration.11 1 The inevitable increase in administrative
Bender & Co. 2009).
108. See e.g. Preseault v. U S., 100 F.3d 1525, 1542-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
109. See e.g. Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 772-73 (N.J. 1977) (holding in leasehold abandonment cases
that "antiquated real property concepts which served as the basis for the pre-existing rule, shall no longer be
controlling," and that "claims must be governed by more modern notions of fairness and equity").
110. Richard Epstein, The Intersectionof Antitrust, Patents,and FDA Law: The TriCorLitigation, GCP: The
at
(available
(Mar. 2009)
1,
11
Competition Policy
for Global
Magazine
Online
=
http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?id 1617&action=907).
111. The Department of Justice, for example, recently changed its position on reverse settlements, arguing
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costs would drastically alter the original assessment of the trade-offs in permitting this
seemingly minor antitrust exception to remain as a backstop to the application of the
simple default rule governing patent conveyances.
In fact, there is some evidence that patent exhaustion doctrine, even if framed
properly as a conveyance default rule, cannot survive even in Epstein's second-best
world without becoming inextricably intertwined with antitrust law. This is arguably
what happened to patent exhaustion doctrine after the enactment of the antitrust laws in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Epstein understands this point, at least
implicitly, given his criticism that the Court adopted its formalistic mandatory rule in
Quanta because it was misled by the intermingling of patent exhaustion doctrine and
1 12
antitrust doctrine in the mid-twentieth century.
Before Quanta, the principal modem patent exhaustion case was the Supreme
Court's 1942 decision in United States v. Univis Lens Co.1 13 This was not a simple
exhaustion case, however, as it arose from the Department of Justice's antitrust
complaint against Univis for illegal price maintenance provisions in its contracts. The
Univis Court applied the then-enforced per se rule in antitrust that prohibited all resale
1 14
price maintenance provisions in contracts between wholesalers and retailers.
Understandably, there was some confusion in Univis as to the scope of exhaustion
doctrine vis-A-vis antitrust law, and the result was a decision that mixed the two legal
1 15
regimes and framed them both in terms of the antitrust per se rule, since abrogated,
that prohibited resale price restrictions in commercial licenses.
Quanta relied heavily on the Univis decision, which is understandable since this
was the most recent decision in which the Supreme Court addressed patent exhaustion
doctrine. 1 16 As Epstein rightly points out, however, its reliance on Univis arguably led
the Quanta Court astray in its understanding of patent exhaustion doctrine. 117 This
explains why the Quanta Court developed a new mandatory rule in patent exhaustion
doctrine; it derived this rule from the per se antitrust treatment of the licensing
provisions in Univis, a case where the Court had intermingled confusingly its antitrust
analysis with its patent exhaustion analysis.
Such confusion between antitrust and patent exhaustion doctrine has substantially
muddied the doctrinal waters, leaving courts and lawyers with little certainty as to the
exact nature of exhaustion doctrine in a post-Quanta world. 118 This state of affairs led
now that these agreements between drug patentees and their generic competitors are presumptively
anticompetitive and therefore subject to antitrust review. See e.g. Br. for the U.S. in Response to the Court's
Invitation, In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-2851-cv(L) (2d Cir.) (available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.htm#3).
112. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at ms. 43 (observing that "many of the earlier cases that involved the patent
exhaustion doctrine were rife with antitrust concerns.").
113. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
114. This per se rule, which was first formulated in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911), was overruled recently in Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007) (establishing rule of reason analysis for price maintenance agreements).
115. Seeid.
116. Quanta Computer, Inc., 128 S. Ct. at 2116-17 ("This Court most recently discussed patent exhaustion
in Univis, on which the District Court relied.").
117. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at 43.
118. Compare Herbert Hovencamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 103,
111 n. 35 (2008) (claiming that the Quanta decision overruled the Federal Circuit's case law on patent
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some commentators to argue that exhaustion doctrine should be eliminated altogether on
119
But this
the grounds that its policy function is better achieved through antitrust law.
throws out the baby with the bathwater-eliminating a valuable conveyance default rule
for property rights in inventions given its unfortunate and inappropriate entanglement
with antitrust doctrine. More important for our purposes here, this is empirical
confirmation that it may be impossible in practice to maintain the integrity of a
conveyance default rule in the shadow of a standards-based antitrust doctrine lurking on
its periphery.
To be fair, Epstein believes that antitrust is problematic only when it is used to
police so-called monopolization by single firms, 120 and that this doctrine actually works
best when it focuses solely on strategic market behavior by multiple firms that
undermine overall social utility. 12 1 Accordingly, he believes that the "best cases for
' 122
and, as such, the rule-ofmonopolization cases often rest on common law wrongs
no
more indeterminate than
be
would
claims
reason standard employed in these antitrust
traditional common law claims against fraud, duress, and other traditional torts.
Moreover, he believes that antitrust should operate in practice as an evidentiary
presumption in favor of the firm or patentee, which the government or private plaintiff
must rebut with evidence of cartelization in order to proceed with its antitrust claims.
Such evidence would then shift the evidentiary burden back to the firm or patentee to
123
establish that its business practices are indeed achieving overall efficiencies.
This might work as Epstein predicts, but if historical practice is any guide, there is
some legitimate concern about whether courts would be able to apply the conveyance
default rule in exhaustion doctrine without ultimately engaging at length with complex
economic arguments by those seeking to invoke the antitrust exception to this default
rule. As Epstein rightly points out, the Quanta Court was confused about exhaustion
doctrine because of a now discredited per se rule in antitrust case law. 124 This does not
bode well for a future Supreme Court's ability to finesse the application of a standardsexhaustion) with Shubha Ghosh, supra n. 81 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's case law on patent exhaustion
"is still good law" because Quanta and these cases "can be read together consistently"). See also Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark IntL, Inc., 615 F.Supp.2d 575, 577 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (stating "that Quanta compels
reconsideration and reversal" of the court's prior decision).
119. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At The Periphery of Intellectual Property

Law, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 174, 198 (2004) (noting that "patents only give a right to exclude" and that any
"right to use is derived from sources external to IP law," such as antitrust). It is unclear if Epstein endorses this
position, but he has implied that he does. See Epstein, supra n. 2. at ms. 43 (noting that "patent exhaustion
doctrine should be treated as a default rule of contract, subject to variation by contrary agreement except when
it flouts the antitrust laws").

120. See Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The New Antitrust Paradox, 72
U. Chi. L. Rev. 49, 49 (2005) (observing that "the wisest course of action is to confine the operation of antitrust
law to cartels and mergers that have the consequence of raising prices and restricting output").
121. See Epstein, supra n. 97, at 19 (noting that "the object of social policy is to identify and enforce those
contracts which show a positive correlation between the private gains of the parties to the transaction and those
of the rest of the social order" and "[iut is only the cartels, territorial divisions, and similar horizontal
arrangements" that undermine this positive correlation).
122. Epstein, supran. IIOat 8.
123. Epstein, supra n. 97, at 217 ("In the presence of radical uncertainty, the burden of proof should lie on
the government.").
124. See Epstein, supra n. 2, at ms. 44 ("[T]he Court in Quanta did not show the slightest awareness that its
dubious use of the patent exhaustion doctrine went a long way to reinstitute the discredited per se rule against
tie-ins of InternationalSalt.").
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based antitrust exception to a conveyance default rule, even in Epstein's second-best
world in which 90-95% success rates count as perfection. 125 According to Epstein, the
Court is not even close to hitting the mark in 95% of its modem patent exhaustion
cases-in its two modem exhaustion cases, its success rate is 0%. If the goal is to have a
viable and determinate default rule for the commercialization of patented inventions, it
may be too much to ask of the courts to engage in the complex economic cost-benefit
analyses that would be necessitated by a standards-based antitrust exception to a
conveyance default rule.
B.

Antitrust and Innovation

Beyond the practical difficulties in maintaining the integrity of a conveyance
default rule in the face of a standards-based exception, there is some further concern that
standards-based antitrust review may even be infeasible when dealing with unpredictable
commercial innovation following an equally unpredictable inventive "flash of
genius."' 12 6 Consistent with Epstein's rejection of per se illegality rules, courts would
have to assess the empirical intricacies of complex commercial contracts involving the
commercialization of property rights in patented inventions. The concern is that these
efficiency calculations may be too complex or indeterminate to provide guidance to
patentees, undermining Epstein's core utilitarian principle that the point of legal rules is
127
to provide "stability in expectations."
It bears emphasizing again the limited scope of this section. The questions raised
here are no more than questions about the role of standards-based antitrust analysis
within Epstein's second-best world of utilitarian social gains achieved through simple
rules that reduce administrative costs arising from complex social interactions. 128 It
would be impossible to provide definitive answers to questions concerning the interplay
between antitrust and patent law within a short section of an article. The purpose here is
simply to raise questions about how Epstein's utilitarian model might handle the
incredibly complex issues that are inherent in the "creative destruction" of new
inventions and innovative commercial practices that upend pre-existing business models
129
and expectations.
Within the context of Epstein's utilitarian defense of rule-of-reason antitrust
analysis, there are two reasons for concern, although they are interrelated. First, an

125. Epstein, supran. 1, at 42.
126. See Harold Evans, They Made America: From the Steam Engine to the Search Engine: Two Centuries
of Innovators 71 (Little, Brown & Co. 2004) (discussing Samuel Morse's self-described "flash of genius" in
conceiving of the telegraph machine in 1832); Grace Rogers Cooper, The Sewing Machine: Its Invention and
Development 30 (2d ed., Smithsonian Insm. Press 1976) (quoting from Isaac M. Singer's description of his
inventive contribution to the development of the sewing machine in 1850, in which he claimed that "it flashed
upon me").
127. Epstein, supra n. 2, at ms. 36.
128. One important issue that is not addressed here is an alternative to both perse illegality rules and rle-ofreason standards: per se legality rules. A per se legality rule might address the problems of ex ante uncertainty
and increased administrative costs in navigating the patent-antitrust nexus. A full assessment of this subject,
however, is beyond the purview of this article, as it requires its own full-scale analysis. See e.g. Geoffrey A.
Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, J. Comp. L. & Econ. (forthcoming)
(available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1490849).
129. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and Democracy 87 (5th ed., Harper Perennial 2008).
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antitrust analysis of a business practice within a relevant market is necessarily ex post.
Second, ex post legal analysis often fails to explain or predict the dynamic commercial
innovation that is promoted and secured to patentees (via such private-ordering
mechanisms as the conveyance default rule).
First, as George Priest pointed out in an oft-cited 1988 article, empirical analysis is
seemingly stymied in providing predictive assessments about the subject matter of
patents-innovation in science and technology. 130 The basic problem is that, even if
economists and lawyers can make the relevant efficiency calculations in assessing
dynamic technological and commercial practices, these assessments are always ex post.
Efficiency analysis is driven by economic models that comprise data concerning
activities that have already occurred in the past. This is what makes it possible to collect,
quantify, and analyze the information in a model that provides robust insights into
economic behavior. In assessing static efficiency in the use of pre-existing property
entitlements, ex post data can be powerfully explanatory and predictive. In dealing with
dynamic efficiency-a core economic concern of intellectual property1 31 --such ex post
analysis becomes more difficult and, as a policy matter, more troublesome.
There are numerous instances of the difficulties with predictive assessments based
on ex post data in a world of innovative creative destruction, but a quick survey of a few
examples will suffice here. First and foremost, there are the well-known, unforeseen
developments in the computer industry in the last half of the twentieth century. In fact,
the birth of the digital revolution is found in one of these unforeseen innovative leaps. In
1958, Jack Kilby was forced to work during his vacation time on his radical idea
concerning silicon-based integrated circuits because his employer, Texas Instruments,
was pursuing other ineffectual projects to address the problems in the existing transistorbased technology. 132 The evolution of personal computers was another innovative storm
that took the commercial world by surprise; the founder and president of Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC), Ken Olson, famously declared in 1977 that "[t]here is no
reason anyone would want a computer in their home." 133 The evolution of the Internet
to predict, as Microsoft discovered in the mid-1990s with
has proven even more difficult
13 4
Netscape.
upstart
of
rise
the
David Adelman and Kathryn DeAngelis also highlight this concern about the
difficulties in predicting the evolution of new innovation in the context of
biotechnology. 135 In their recent study of biotech patenting patterns, Adelman and
DeAngelis found that Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg's predictions in the mid130. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers about Intellectual Property, 8 Res. L. &
Econs. 19, 21-22 (1986).
131. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual PropertyLaw 1921 (Belknap Press 2003).
132. See T.R. Reid, The Chip: How Two Americans Invented the Microchip and Launched a Revolution 7576 (Simon & Schuster 2001).
133. Jamie Frater, Top 30 Failed Technology Predictions, http://listverse.com/history/top-30-failedtechnology-predictions (last accessed Oct. 16, 2009).
134. See US. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that by 1995, Netscape's
"share of browser usage stood well above seventy percent, and no other browser enjoyed more than a fraction
of the remainder"), rev "din partand aff'd in part, US. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
135. David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the
Biotech PatentDebate, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1687-89 (2007).
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1990s that patents would stifle innovation in the nascent biotech industry failed to pan
out. 136 These predictions, they concluded, resulted from a "misuse of patent metrics,"
which "fostered dire predictions and created unrealistic expectations about the capacity
of patent data to guide policy. ' 137 Contrary to Heller and Eisenberg's predictions of an
imminent anti-commons in the biotech industry, Adelman and DeAngelis's survey
revealed a healthy and viable industry in which ownership of patents is diffuse, patent
applications are rising, and new firms continue to enter the market unabated.138
There are lots of reasons for this "divergence between data and theory" in biotech
patents, 139 but one explanation is that the problem is not with the empirical studies or
their methodologies but rather with the nature of scientific or technological innovation.
Adelman and DeAngelis, for instance, emphasize in their survey that empirical studies
' 140
face tremendous "analytical barriers [that] stem from the phenomena being studied,"
such as "the open-ended nature of biotechnology science' ' 14 1 and the "enigmatic nature
of invention." 142 In sum, they conclude that "[i]nventive success is simply a hard
phenomenon to study given our current level of knowledge and the subject matter's
43
inherent complexity." 1
Mark Lemley, a noted patent scholar, has also acknowledged "that we don't have a
clue how innovation works" and that "we may never be able to know exactly what sparks
a thought or a creative idea in somebody's mind." 144 In the 1960s, the economist F.M.
Scherer came to similar conclusions in assessing some of the early attempts at modeling
both patenting behavior and the commercial use of patented inventions in the
marketplace. 145 Although economic modeling certainly has become more sophisticated
in the ensuing decades, the basic problem remains. Joshua Wright recently observed,
after surveying the economic literature on the issue of competition analysis and
innovation, that "[o]ur economic knowledge regarding innovation itself, conduct
affecting innovation, and how to assess competitive outcomes involving tradeoffs
between product market competition and innovation are far less impressive than our
knowledge in a purely static setting."' 14 6 In essence, the socio-economic effects of
136. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 699 (1998) (arguing that an anticommons in biotech patents would
occur as a result of a large increase in patent applications in the 1990s); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology
PolicyPerspective on the NIH Gene PatentingControversy, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 633, 634-35 (1994).
137. Adelman & DeAngelis, supran. 135, at 1680.
138. See generally id.
139. Id. at 1681. Adelman and DeAngelis suggest that one reason is Heller's and Eisenberg's reliance on
mere patent counts, which they claim "prove[s] to be a very weak metric." Id.
140. Id.at 1727.
141. Adelman & DeAngelis, supra n. 135, at 1700.
142. Id. at 1727.
143. Id.
144. Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital,4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L.
137, 139 (2000).
145. See Frederick M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented
Inventions, 55 Am. Econ. Rev. 1098 (1965).
146. Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an
Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?, in Regulating Innovation, supra n. 17, _ (ms. 4, available at
http://ssm.coin/abstract=1463732). See also David S. Evans & Keith N. Hyton, The Lawful Acquisition and
Exercise of Monopoly Power and the Implicationsfor the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 Competition Policy Intl.
203 (2008) (suggesting that current antitrust analysis is biased against dynamic competition because this
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innovation in science and technology seem unpredictable, 147 at least given the current
state of our knowledge concerning both innovation and how to model the relevant
economic behavior.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged this point in its 1980 decision in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,in which it observed that "Congress employed broad general
language" in the statutory provision defining what counts as patentable subject matter
"precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable."' 14 8 In saying this, the
Chakrabarty Court affirmed that innovative, cutting-edge biotech products should be
patentable. 149 Coincidentally, although perhaps not, Chakrabarty spawned the biotech
revolution in the United States, 150 the subject of Adelman and DeAngelis's study that
further confirms the vital point that innovation in science and technology is often
unforeseeable.

Of course, it is not only modem inventions, such as in computers and biotech,
which lead to unforeseeable transformations in the commercial exploitation of new

patented products. This is an omnipresent theme throughout the history of innovation.
The invention and commercial development of the steam engine in the eighteenth
century, for example, was an achievement not of formally trained scientists but of simple
mechanics, James Watt and Matthew Boulton. 15 1 Boulton and Watt's technological
innovation helped spur the Industrial Revolution (and follow-on development of
52
scientific theories, such as classical thermodynamics). 1
One such follow-on invention in the first half of the nineteenth century was the

railroad, which replaced the extensive canal system as the primary means of commercial
Contemporary estimates of total public and private
and personal transportation.
investment

in the

canal

system built

in the

antebellum

period range

between

Despite this massive capital
approximately $188 million and $300 million. 153
investment, the canals were supplanted within a few scant years by the railroad system, a
154
more efficient means of transportation.
analysis is based on models of static competition).
147. See e.g. Tom Maddox & Paul Wallich, The Cultural Consequences of the Information Superhighway,
18 Wilson Q. 29, 29 (Summer 1994) (noting that, "[a]s technophobes are fond of pointing out, technology's
effects are generally unpredictable").
148. Chakrabartyv. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
149. Id.
150. See Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 77 (4th ed., Lexis 2007) (noting how
Chakrabarty was "extremely important for the then nascent biotechnology industry because it established that
the fruits of the industry's research . . . would be eligible for patenting"); John Edward Schneider,
Microorganims and the Patent Office: To Deposit or Not to Deposit, That is the Question, 52 Fordham L. Rev.
592, 592, 594 (1984) (noting that the "revolution in biotechnology is one of the most important developments
affecting industry in the twentieth century" and that Chakrabarty"spurred the increased commercial interest in
biotechnology" (footnotes omitted)).
151. See Matthew B. Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft, The New Atlantis 12 (Summer 2006). They had to
enforce their patent rights, too. See Boulton & Watt v. Bull, 126 E. R. 651 (C.P. 1795).
152. See Crawford, supra n. 151, at 12.
153. Carter Goodrich et al., Canals and American Economic Development 209 (Columbia U. Press 1961)
(estimating investment made in developing canal system between 1829 and 1860 at $188.17 million); Robert
W. Harrison, The Great Era of American Canal Building: 1825-1850, in The United States Waterways and
Ports: A Chronology, vol. 1, 10 (1980) (estimating total investment in "navigation canals" by 1850 to be "over
$300 million").
154. See Harold G. Moulton, Waterways Versus Railways 79 (Cambridge U. Press 1912) (noting that "the
waterways are unable to compete for freight which is of considerable value or which requires a speedy
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Of course, the canal system was not a foolhardy venture. The canals were central
to the early economic development of the country, providing the most extensive and
cost-efficient means of national transportation of goods and people at the time. 155 More
important, during the heyday of canal development in the 1820s and 1830s, railroads
"were considered an extremely risky technology and were the focal point of vigorous
debate in engineering and commercial circles."' 156 In other words, the technology that
made railroads feasible, such as the patented Westinghouse airbrake, 157 had not yet been
invented at the time the canal system was put into place. Locomotive trains were
unproven and risky in both technological and commercial terms. The full-scale use and
commercial development of the railways as a national transportation system was
unforeseeable in the antebellum period, and thus the canal system was the best
transportation technology at that time.
In the antebellum era, the radical inventions that further revolutionized both
industrial and commercial practices were often the result of the efforts of people who
would now be identified as hobbyists; that is, individuals working outside of their
15
professional training or full-time employment. The invention of the telegraph,
vulcanized rubber, 159 and the sewing machine 16 are just a few examples of how
"outsiders" revolutionized an industry in often unexpected ways. And the commercial
progress that followed these pioneering inventions was equally innovative. Isaac Singer,
one of the inventors of the sewing machine, also conceived of tremendously innovative
commercial practices in thinking of ways to profit from his new invention; he and his
enterprise, including the first rent-tobusiness partner invented many firsts in American
16
own program and the first trade-in program. 1
Later in the nineteenth century, Thomas Edison became famous for his invention
of the first practicable incandescent light bulb, but he also had to invent the first
electrical grid, conceiving of the network of generators, electrical wires, transformers,
etc. to make it possible for people to purchase and use his new invention. 162 Of course,
Edison's invention and commercial development of electrical grids made it possible for
delivery," and that the "superiority of the railways in handling high-class freight is universally admitted").
155. See Spiro G. Patton, Canals in American Business and Economic History. A Review of the Issues, 6
Canal History and Tech. Procs. 3, 17 (March 28, 1987) (noting that the canals promoted extensive commercial
development in the U.S., and thus the canals were a successful economic investment in transportation
infrastructure).
156. Id. at 10.
157. George Westinghouse patented the "straight air brake" in 1869 (U.S. Patent No. 88,929) and later
patented the automatic "quick action" brake in 1887 (U.S. Patent No. 360,070). Given that the ability to stop a
moving train is fundamental to its feasible use as a means of transportation, Westinghouse's inventions were
central to the development of the railroads. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 54547 (1898) (discussing evolution of the air brake as central technology in development of the railways).
158. See Evans, supra n. 126, at 71-77. Samuel Morse was a painter when he conceived of the technology
that would become the telegraph. Id.
159. . Charles Slack, Noble Obsession: Charles Goodyear, Thomas Hancock. and The Race to Unlock the
GreatestIndustrialSecret of the Nineteenth Century (Hyperion 2002).
160. See Adam Mossoff, A Stitch in Time: The Rise and Fall of the Sewing Machine Patent Thicket 1321(Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 09-19, Mar. 6, 2009) (available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1354849).
161. See id. at 43-46. Singe also pioneered the hiring of women in operating the sewing machine, which
was something quite controversial in the socially conservative antebellum era. Id.
162. Evans, supra n. 126, at 165.
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even more tremendous follow-on inventions that exploited this easy access to electricity,
such as the early twentieth-century invention of the radio. 163 Yet, even though Edison
was a widely successful, full-time, professional inventor, he failed to foresee this next
proclaiming that "as far as he could tell, the radio had 'no
great inventive leap forward,
' 164
future."'
commercial
Given that professional inventors and businesspersons often fail to predict the next
wave of innovation, one may legitimately wonder whether judges have any better
institutional competence. Unfortunately, the courts' difficulties in handling the inherent
unpredictability in the evolution of science and technology are not a mere prediction.
One prominent example is the rarely remembered 1984 decision in Digidyne Corp. v.
Data General Corp.,165 in which Chief Judge Browning of the Ninth Circuit confidently
concluded that Data General Corp. possessed monopoly-like power in the personal
computer operating system (OS) market with its product, R-DOS. On the basis of its
conclusion that Data General Corp. wielded such power in the OS market, the Ninth
tying sales of
Circuit held that Data General Corp. violated the antitrust laws by illegally
66
R-DOS to sales of its proprietary computer system, called NOVA. 1
Today, in a computer industry dominated by Microsoft, Apple Computer, eBay,
Google, Amazon.com, and Facebook, few people if any have even heard of R-DOS, let
alone Data General Corp. But in 1984, Apple Computer and Microsoft were the new
kids on the block, developing the personal computers and software that the established
giants in the computer industry, such as Data General Corp. and DEC, were predicting
would be a complete failure. 167 Moreover, no one foresaw in 1984 the rise of the
Internet a decade later, either as a medium of mass communication or commerce. But
the Digidyne court was not basing-and, in fact, it could not base-its antitrust decision
on a prediction of such imminent developments in the computer industry; the only
evidence for the jury verdict affirmed by the Ninth Circuit was what had happened in the
past.
In light of the evidence submitted in the antitrust litigation in Digidyne, Data
General Corp. was painted at trial as the proverbial 900-lbs. gorilla that held fast in its
grip the entire computer operating system market. At that time, Data General Corp. had
over $1 billion in sales following its meteoric rise in the early computer industry in the
1960s and 1970s. 16 8 Such sales numbers were an order of magnitude larger than the
sales of then-fledging Microsoft Corp. 169 But Data General Corp. was soon supplanted
by Microsoft, Apple, and other new upstart firms who were innovators in the cutting163. See id. at 216-33.
164. Donald A. Norman, The Invisible Computer: Why Good Products Can Fail,the PersonalComputer Is
So Complex, and Information Appliances Are the Solution 239 (MIT Press 1999).
165. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
166. Id. at 1344 ("The jury found as a fact that defendant possessed and used [its] power [in its RDOS
product] by means of the tying arrangement to appreciably restrain competition in the market for NOVA
instruction set CPUs. The evidence outlined above fully supported the jury's verdict.").
167. See supra n. 131 and accompanying text.
168. See Data General,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data-General (last modified Oct. 16, 2009) (noting that
Data General Corporation had 20% annual sales growth in the 1970s as a result of its NOVA OS and, by 1984,
it had $1 billion in sales).
169. See History of Microsoft, http://www.thocp.net/companies/microsoft/microsoftLcompany.htm (last
updated July 10, 2008) (noting that Microsoft generated approximately $97.5 million in sales in 1984).
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edge personal computer and software markets that soon swept the computer industry and
revolutionized the market (again).
It is perhaps unsurprising that, soon after the Digidyne decision, Data General
Corp. and DEC began sliding into oblivion, as their server-based workstations were
replaced with personal computers running third-party software. By the end of the 1990s,
the few remaining assets of both companies were purchased by other computer
companies. After briefly reviewing this story at a conference addressing the role of
antitrust in the new high-tech age, Judge Easterbrook noted how the Digidyne court's
self-assured antitrust analysis was misplaced:
Confident conclusions about who is a monopolist, and what is a bottleneck in operating
systems, were converted to a source of humor in a few years. As Santayana observed,
those who fail to learn from the past are condemned to repeat it. We need to learn from
IBM and [Data General] just how acute are the legal system's senses in detecting
technological monopolies. I70
Of course, it is important to acknowledge that the Digidyne decision was reached
on the basis of a per se rule that an owner of a patent or copyright presumptively
possessed market power, and this rule has now been abrogated in favor of a rule-ofreason analysis. 17 1 It thus appears that Epstein might be able to chalk up this decision to
the dangerous error costs that are inevitably incurred under an antitrust regime of per se
rules of illegality. The Digidyne court, however, did not simply rest on its laurels with
the then-enforced per se rule. It engaged in a brief analysis of Data General Corp.'s
market power with its R-DOS product in the operating system market, identifying the
same issues raised in the Microsoft antitrust litigation years later concerning market
new
share, the "lock in" effect for pre-existing consumers, and the barriers of entry to
172
system.
operating
dominant
a
of
effects
network
positive
the
given
market entrants
As Judge Easterbrook notes, Digidyne may seem quaint today,173 but it is a stark
warning of the perils of antitrust analysis as applied to the innovative commercial
markets that arise from intellectual property rights. 174 In fact, the Digidyne court
observed that a central reason for Data General Corp.'s market success-and thus its
corresponding market power under antitrust law-was that it "vigorously" enforced its
intellectual property rights in its proprietary R-DOS operating system. 175 To paraphrase
Epstein, if courts consider innovation to be a subterfuge for anti-competitive behavior,
then firms dedicated to the commercial exploitation of their intellectual property rights
into court by
may find themselves working under the constant threat of being dragged
76
either competitors or the government to answer to antitrust charges. 1
Of course, Epstein could still account for Digidyne within his conception of an
170. Frank H. Easterbook, Information andAntitrust, 2000 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 1, 10-11 (2000).
171. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
172. DigidyneCorp., 734 F.2d at 1341-44.
173. Easterbrook, supra n. 170, at 10.
174. The Digidyne decision seems to exemplify the concern that "[t]here is a danger that our incomplete
understanding of competition and innovation might lead to a tendency to condemn conduct because it is
difficult to understand or might appear to potentially harm innovation without also finding an anticompetitive
effect." Wright, supra n. 146, at ms. 31.
175. Digidyne Corp., 734 F.2d at 1342.
176. See supra n. 120 and accompanying text.
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antitrust policy that functions in an "explicitly utilitarian framework whose central tenet
is that in the general case, social welfare is greater in competitive than monopoly
First, he could claim that Digidyne confirms that single-firm
industries." 177
monopolization claims under the Sherman Act, such as those asserted against Data
General Corp., are extremely problematic and "subject to incisive criticism." 17 8 He
would thus agree with Judge Easterbrook's assessment of Digidyne, adding that this case
presents "the perils of over-ambition under Section 2 of the Sherman Act." 1 7 9 Although
Digidyne involved a § 1 tying claim, it still exemplifies Epstein's concern that, in dealing
with single-firm monopolization claims (typically asserted under § 2), "false positives
[are] high, the harms that these actions are meant to combat are difficult to identify with
confidence, the benefits that these practices create for consumers in the short run are
ignored, and the administrative costs of the system are great."180 Thus, Digidyne is not a
counter-example to Epstein's endorsement of using antitrust doctrine to police the
boundaries of the commercialization of patented inventions; rather, he would maintain
that it confirms his position that antitrust will succeed as a simple rule in a complex
world only if this doctrine is "restrained" to the "sensible" goal of maximizing overall
social utility. 18'
Second, Epstein acknowledges the inherent difficulties in navigating the
intersection of the intellectual property laws and antitrust law in the context of innovative
commercial products and practices. Accordingly, even if Digidyne is not limited to only
error-cost problems associated with single-firm tying claims, it could still serve as a
confirmation of the complexities of these issues. In fact, Epstein has suggested that
sanctioning tying practices under the antitrust laws is not per se wrong, but that it should
follow a rule of reason analysis that gives sufficient weight to the efficiency justification
for a tying arrangement. 182 As he has remarked in the context of pharmaceutical patents,
another area involving the complex interplay between differing legal regimes, "it has
often [been] noted how difficult it is to apply the antitrust law to new product designsthink of the integrated products in the Microsoft litigation.'' 183 This is why Epstein
believes that antitrust ideally should be restrained to only those cases in which it is
possible to generate clear evidence of market practices that undermine social utility.
Otherwise, the "uncertainties that [monopolization cases] impose are sure to adversely
184
impact innovation and technological progress."
This point about the negative impact on dynamic efficiency in science and
technology arising from the inherently complex protection and regulation of these fields
within multiple legal regimes brings us back to the overarching question of this part of
the article: is it possible to achieve Epstein's goal of higher overall social utility with

177. Epstein, supra n. 120, at 49.
178. Id. at 71.
179. Epstein, supra n. 97, at 237.
180. Epstein, supra n. 120, at 72.
181. Epstein, supra n. 1, at 126.
182. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Propertyfor the Technological Age 15-16, www.nam.org/-/
media/Files/snan/docs/236800/236749.pdf.ashx (May 2006).
183. Epstein, supra n. 110, at 11-12.
184, Epstein, supra n. 97121, at 237.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2008

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 44 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 3
TULSA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:707

antitrust serving as a doctrinal backstop to the conveyance default rule for the
commercialization of patented inventions? In the previous section, this question was
asked in the context of whether standards-based antitrust review would ultimately trump
the application of the conveyance default rule. Given the experiences in other legal
doctrines in which standards have defacto replaced rules, it may be asking too much of
the courts to maintain the doctrinal integrity (and thus the social benefits) of a
conveyance default rule in cases in which standards-based antitrust claims would also be
asserted as a matter of course.
In this section, the question about antitrust and dynamic efficiency in innovation
dovetails with this earlier concern, but it is slightly different. Here, the question is
whether the courts have the institutional competence necessary to account for the impact
of their antitrust decisions on future technological and commercial innovation. Given
that innovation is fundamental to higher social utility, which is the guiding tenet in
Epstein's jurisprudence of simple rules for a complex world, this is as serious a concern
as the potential deleterious impact of a default rule becoming swamped by an
indeterminate, context-sensitive standard.
This is particularly salient in the context of an antitrust regime comprising rule-ofreason standards, as this requires courts to engage in sophisticated economic analysis in
determining whether a particular commercial practice has undermined overall social
utility. As Michael Baye and Joshua Wright have recently observed, the "shift towards a
modem antitrust landscape favoring a case-by-case, rule of reason approach to
evaluating business conduct" now requires "judicial evaluation of complex economic
and econometric analysis." 185 They find that cases increasingly rely on a "battle of the
experts," as it is "difficult to imagine how a judge untrained in economics might evaluate
on
the competitive effects of a defendant's complex pricing scheme solely by relying 186
intuition."
untrained
and
empiricism,
causal
interpretation,
precedent, statutory
Ultimately, their empirical study of antitrust cases and appeal and reversal rates confirms
in modem antitrust
that "increasing levels of economic sophistication and 1complexity
87
returns."
marginal
negative
generating
now
are
litigation
Moreover, as discussed above, even if courts could flawlessly evaluate this
complex economic analysis, such econometric models by necessity comprise only ex
post data, which has historically proven to be a very poor predictor of future innovation
in science and technology. 188 Wright has observed that "the current state of economic
theory and empirical knowledge regarding the relationship between innovation and
competition does not yet provide a general and reliable basis for antitrust
intervention."' 189 In the patent law context, Gregory Mandel has also observed that
185. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicatedfor GeneralistJudges? The Impact
ofEconomic Complexity and Judicial Trainingon Appeals 1, (George Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper No.
09-07, Jan. 27, 2009) (available at http:/ssm.com/abstract--1319888).
186. Id.at 4.
187. Id.at 29. Moreover, in a large portion of the complex cases in their sample, Baye and Wright found
that a judge's economic training had no statistically significant impact on appeal and reversal rates, which
suggests that these cases involve questions that are too complex to get right consistently even for judges who
are properly trained in economic analysis. Id.at 29-31.
188. See supra nn. 132-170 and accompanying text.
189. Wright, supra n. 146, at ms.29.
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of the limits of their knowledge and ability to
"decision-makers must remain cognizant
190
foresee new technology issues."
Again, to his credit, Epstein has acknowledged in his far-ranging scholarship these
institutional and empirical constraints, as he often expresses concerns about the
19 1
He is not alone in
institutional competence of courts to get it right in antitrust cases.
these concerns, especially in the context of applying antitrust to complex commercial
practices arising from patented inventions. 192 Yet Epstein mostly limits his concerns in
the context of his criticism of the single-firm monopolization cases, such as the 1982
breakup of AT&T, which created the two-tiered system of AT&T and the regional baby
bells. Epstein recently noted that, in imposing this structural remedy, Judge Greene
"guessed wrong as to the future shape of the industry and, thus, created a structure that
could not survive.' ' 193 Today, Epstein observes, the "once impregnable local exchange
194
In other words, an
monopolies have yielded to cell phone and VOIP transmission.,
imminent technological innovation made moot a prior technological and market structure
imposed by judicial fiat. Even more important, in 1982, few people foresaw the rise of
cell phones in the 1990s or of VOIP in the early twenty-first century, except perhaps for
the few inventors and innovators working to make these amazing new products and
services possible.
All of this confirms that institutional competence concerns exist in the allegedly
more easy antitrust cases involving horizontal market divisions, in which courts would
be required to evaluate innovative commercial practices with only 20-20 hindsight to
guide them. The problem is that such cases arise from innovative market structures that
recently came into existence or may be just around the comer and yet to realize their full
practical commercial effect. In such contexts, the litigation costs imposed on patentees
in defending against the inevitable antitrust claims and the error costs inherent in judicial
decision-making concerning new innovation, especially in our new high-tech world, are
very real administrative costs. 195 This raises the question of whether Epstein can
maintain on his utilitarian standard a restrained antitrust exception as a backstop to the
efficiencies achieved by the conveyance default rule.
Epstein acknowledges in the context of single-firm monopolization cases that the
"uncertainties that they impose are sure to adversely impact innovation and technological
190. Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessonsfor a General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 Minn. J.L., Sci.
& Tech. 551, 563 (2007).
191. See e.g. Richard Epstein, supra n. 110, at 12 (noting the "institutional shortcomings of courts [in the
Microsoft case] show once again that antitrust law offers no cure-all"); id. at 16 (observing that "antitrust law is
a poor vehicle for rate setting, given the absence of any coherent institutional capacity to do so in the courts").
192. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on
Antitrust:An Application to PatentHoldup, 5 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 469 (2009) (maintaining that the high social
costs in false negatives in antitrust enforcement in patent cases counsels courts to employ when possible other
enforcement mechanisms in traditional legal regimes, such as contract and tort); cf Timothy J. Murns,
Improving the Economic Foundations of Competition Policy, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 2 (2003) (observing
that antitrust needs to embrace "a careful, fact-based economic analysis grounded in a thorough understanding
of the relevant institutions").
193. Epstein, supran. 97121, at 228.
194. Id.
195. See Wright, supra n. 146, at ms. 31 ("There is a danger that our incomplete understanding of
competition and innovation might lead to a tendency to condemn conduct because it is difficult to understand
or might appear to potentially harm innovation without also finding an anticompetitive effect.").
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progress. ' 196 It is worth considering whether the same observation holds true for
applying antitrust generally to the commercialization of patented inventions. As one
commentator has observed, "economists often take decades to understand certain
business practices."' 19 7 Such concerns are particularly pressing in the context of the ex
ante uncertainties inherent both in the evolution of science and technology and in its
commercial application in the marketplace.
In fact, the conveyance default rule crafted by nineteenth-century courts secured
freedom to patent-owners to innovate in circumstances in which it was often impossible
to predict new commercial uses of their patented inventions. In this way, the conveyance
default rule best secured dynamic efficiency in the American patent system-it left
owners free to make the most productive use of their property. As Justice Joseph Story
wrote in 1824 on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, "[t]he inventor has.., a
property in his inventions; a property which is often of very great value, and of which the
law intended to give him the absolute enjoyment and possession."' 198 Thus, it is
important to ask if the inherent complexity and indeterminacy arising from the use of
antitrust in patent law counsels against its use in Epstein's second-best world of simple
rules for complex innovation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In 1996, in one of his earliest forays into intellectual property scholarship, Epstein
conceded that he could "make no strong claim to expertise on patent law,"199 but within
a few scant years it was clear that he could no longer credibly say this. In the ensuing
years, Epstein has emerged as an indefatigable exponent of the virtues of intellectual
property, identifying the importance of legally enforcing both its substantive protections
and its limitations. Although Epstein's early work focused on the functionalist
justification for the legal rules concerning the rights of acquisition and exclusion, as well
as the rough second-best justification for durational term limits, 200 he has more recently
engaged the debate over the importance of securing to patentees their rights of use and
disposition in their inventions.
In so doing, he has applied his utilitarian framework to conveyances of patent
rights and concluded that courts should enforce the same conveyance default rule in
patents as they have long enforced in property law. Although Epstein does not survey
historical patent doctrine in advancing this proposition, it is perhaps unsurprising to
discover that nineteenth-century courts crafted exactly the type of doctrinal rule that he
argues for entirely on normative grounds. This provides important empirical support for
Epstein's thesis that the Quanta Court has seriously undermined the efficient operation

196. Epstein, supra n. 97121, at 237.
197. Dennis W. Carlton, A GeneralAnalysis of Exclusionary Conduct andRefusal to Deal-Why Aspen and
Kodak are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L.J. 659, 680 (2001).
198. Exparte Wood, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824).
199. Epstein, PropertyRights, supra n. 6, at 575.
200. See supra n. 6 and accompanying text. See also Richard A. Epstein, Why LibertariansShouldn't Be
(Too) Skeptical About Intellectual Property 7-10 (Progress & Freedom Found. Progress on Point Working
Paper No. 13.4, Feb. 13, 2006) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=981779)
(discussing acquisition, exclusion, and duration issues in intellectual property).
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of patent conveyances with its new mandatory rule that any conveyance operates to
extinguish all property rights in a patented invention.
Epstein's utilitarian defense of the conveyance default rule, however, has within it
the potential seeds of its own demise. He endorses rule-of-reason antitrust analysis to
police the boundaries of the conveyance default rule on the basis of his utilitarian theory
that legal rules should operate to maximize overall social utility. A standards-based
antitrust regime, however, threatens the integrity of the ex ante security in interests
served by the conveyance default rule. In practice, standards-based legal regimes tend to
swamp rules, leading to highly granular and indeterminate adjudication in each case.
Moreover, there is an open question as to whether the courts have the institutional
competence to evaluate ex ante the innovative market structures that result from
unpredictable inventions in science and technology. The result may be that the error
costs, both real ex post and imagined ex ante, undermine the overall social utility
achieved by the conveyance default rule, even in Epstein's second-best world.
With that said, there is still much to appreciate in Epstein's work on intellectual
property, and such remarks should be understood to be concerns expressed among
friends. In fact, in his property-based defense of intellectual property, Epstein has found
2 1
himself staking out his typically unique positions in modem policy debates, 0 but this
time he has found himself opposed to fellow libertarians who are highly critical of
intellectual property. 2 02 In speaking against his libertarian friends in defense of
intellectual property,20 3 in particular, Aristotle would likely commend Epstein's
commitment to truth.

201. See e.g. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19, 23-24 n. 22 (2008)
(acknowledging Epstein's work as "the most thoughtful" of the property approach, but still criticizing his
"baseline assumption"); Menell, supra n. 3 (critiquing Epstein generally as a proponent of the "property rights
movement" in intellectual property).
202. See e.g. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in Copy Fights: The

Future ofIntellectualPropertyin the Information Age 1,4 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews Jr. eds., Cato
Inst. 2002) (arguing that "copyright and patent protection contradicts Locke's justification of property");
Timothy B. Lee, Copyright and Patent, in Cato Handbookfor Policymakers 393, 393-94 (7th ed., Cato Inst.
2008) (arguing that copyright and patent "legal regimes are very different from traditional property rights,"
although acknowledging that "the analogy to property rights provides a useful guide for improving these legal
regimes").
203. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6 (Joe Sachs trans., Focus Publishing 2002) (observing that "while
both [the truth and one's friends] are loved, it is a sacred thing to give the higher honor to the truth").
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